Lifting the Fog of Peace How Americans Learned to Fight Modern War

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Georgetown University, 2005).
110 " lifting the fog of peace
four companies, each comprised of noninfantry troops from various sup-
port branches and led by captains from the signal, medical, military in-
telligence, and engineering branches. Thus, in preparation for their de-
ployment to Iraq in the fall of 2005, these four noninfantry captains and
their commander from the engineering branch were charged with train-
ing noninfantry troops for infantry-type tactics, techniques, and proce-
dures such as combat patrolling, 9 re and maneuver, and convoy opera-
tions in hostile terrain. Although these captains lamented the lack of
formal education they had received during their seven-year careers,
their ability to prepare for this challenging mission was greatly enhanced
by the Army s dynamic tactical learning system, described here. This sys-
tem included the products and services provided by the Center for Army
Lessons Learned, which were in turn being fed new information daily
from Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere around the world.
From Experiential to Organizational Learning through
the CTC Model
The CTC and CALL processes allow for all four elements of David Kolb s
familiar experiential learning cycle (9 g. 3): (1) concrete experience, (2)
observation and re: ection, (3) forming abstract concepts, and (4) test-
ing in new situations.32 Following the mock battle scenario correspond-
ing to step 1, steps 2 and 3 require a concrete picture of what happened
and why, as well as an analysis of how to do things better next time (step
4). Steps 2 and 3 are folded into the AAR and debrie9 ngs at the CTCs,
while step 4 is eventually played out in training at home stations or upon
deployment to the real theater of operations.
During the CTC exercise, the critical learning event is the AAR de-
brie9 ng, during which OCs and other of9 cers question leader decisions
and suggest alternatives. This corresponds to steps 2 and 3 in the cycle,
allowing participants to review the events and form a mental assessment
of what went right and what went wrong. Just as when a football team re-
views the game tape the day after the lost match, all the sensing equip-
ment on the battle9 eld and the ability to identify exactly who did what
and where leave little room for debate over the course of events. In this
environment, there is little room for arrogance as well. As one observer
described the AAR environment, the after-action reviews began to take
on the feel of a group therapy session for a somewhat dysfunctional fam-
ily, with junior of9 cers increasingly questioning the decisions and ac-
32. D. A. Kolb, Experiential Learning (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1984).
Learning to Learn " 111
Fig. 3. Experiential learning cycle. (Data from D. A. Kolb, Experiential Learning
[Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1984].)
tions of their superiors that had just gotten them destroyed on the bat-
tle9 eld. 33 With the stakes as high as potential defeat on the battle9 eld,
truth becomes increasingly more important than ego.
The learning environment promoted by the CTC model had a pro-
found effect on the Army. James Kit9 eld observes,
Though they did not yet realize it, that willingness of junior of9 cers to
openly question their superiors, and of superior of9 cers to admit mis-
takes in front of their subordinates, was beginning to fundamentally
change the culture of the Army. An organization that would once
have considered such behavior little short of insubordination began
to encourage self-criticism in an effort to get at the truth.34
Moreover, the importance of critical after-the-fact re: ection on one s
own actions and the actions of one s unit began to be instilled in soldiers
at all ranks. When OCs shadow leaders during the exercise, asking them
what they are thinking and why, soldiers learn to re: ect on their internal
decision-making processes and on the performance of their unit.
The scenarios practiced at the CTCs are derived from formal doc-
trine and real-life operations. The scenario developers and OCs at the
centers have shelves of well-worn 9 eld manuals from which they are con-
stantly pulling references to incorporate into scenarios and to discuss in
the AARs. Thus, as General Kevin Byrnes, the former commander of the
Army s Training and Doctrine Command, claimed, the CTCs function as
33. Kit9 eld, Prodigal Soldiers.
34. Ibid., 311.
112 " lifting the fog of peace
injection points for new knowledge, new doctrine, and even Army cul-
ture.35 Although of9 cers may not have read the latest formal doctrinal
manuals, they become familiar with their contents through practice at
the centers. As one veteran explained the link, if the learning system is
functioning properly, doctrine becomes like the Bible in that few
people read it, but most are familiar with the Ten Commandments. 36
It is important to recognize that this process was no accident. Army
leaders were familiar with the new theories of organizational learning as
they developed and re9 ned the CTC program. As General Gordon Sulli-
van writes, the AAR system was the key to turning the corner and insti-
tutionalizing organizational learning. Still, he describes a learning or-
ganization as an elusive concept, something you aspire to always
becoming, yet never truly being. Later, as chief of staff of the Army in
the early 1990s, General Sullivan would actively consult organizational
learning theorists such as Peter Senge to help improve the Army s ability
to adapt to what he knew was a rapidly changing post Cold War envi-
ronment.37
In sum, the National Training Center was a concerted effort by the
Army leadership to promote learning through doing at the unit level.
This realistic scenario-based training allowed the various elements of an
armored brigade to practice a choreographed battle plan against an op-
posing force. While this innovation improved the readiness of the big
army to conduct large land war against the Soviets, it did little to address
requirements at the lower end of the spectrum. For this, light forces and
Special Operations Command pushed for the creation of a separate
training center, the Joint Readiness Training Center.
The Joint Readiness Training Center: A Place to Call Their Own
Writing of his battalion s experience when confronted with a hostile
mob of armed Haitian civilians in November 1995, Lieutenant Colonel
Dan Bolger (later promoted to general) claimed,
The way [Staff Sergeant Brian Cagle] reacted, and the calm discipline
shown by this NCO and his men came from training like that con-
ducted at the Joint Readiness Training Center. Indeed, the reason a
solitary ri: e squad did not hesitate to quell an ugly mob came from
35. General Kevin Byrnes, USA, Commander Training and Education Command, per-
sonal interview by author, February 7, 2005, Fort Monroe, VA.
36. Joseph Collins, personal interview by author, April 15, 2004.
37. General Gordon Sullivan, USA, personal interview by author, February 25, 2005,
Arlington, VA.
Learning to Learn " 113
the con9 dence bred in the swamps, forests, and sham villages of
JRTC.38
At the time of this unit s deployment to Haiti, little de9 nitive doctrine [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

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