0415423511.Routledge.Understanding.Terrorist.Innovation.May.2007

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of not only forcing a decline in 17N bombings, but even completely
pushing aside the signature .45 caliber weapon assassination tactic for the
next 2 years. First, however, the group had to find the capability to launch
the stolen rockets. Specifically for this purpose, five armed 17N members
robbed the World War II museum on Rizaris Street in Athens on 3 Febru-
ary 1990, stealing two World War II era bazookas.482 The design of these
devices was then analyzed and imitated for the production of makeshift
launchers made out of plastic tubes.483 As a part of the group s reliance on
signature attacks, these home-made rocket launchers were then always left at
the site of launch. Another interesting aspect of the rocket attacks was the
Revolutionary Organization November 17 131
operational considerations involved in the selection of targets most of the
rocket attacks were launched from construction sites on buildings opposite
to the target, where the launchers were fired from behind large billboards
often placed on such sites.
17N s first use of rockets occurred shortly after the museum robbery, in
the assassination attempt against shipping magnate Vardis Vardinoyiannis.
The operation was spectacular in the sense that three missiles were used to
hit a moving target, but ultimately a failure since Vardinoyiannis survived
the attack after the rockets failed to penetrate his armor-plated limousine.484
During the rest of 1990 17N stepped up its violent campaign, in most cases
possibly out of excitement or for practice reasons using rockets. Some of
the notable 1990 attacks include the firing of rockets on the Athens offices
of several companies inducing Procter and Gamble, which were attacked
twice during a single month.485 Another notable operation was the attack
against the European Community (EC) offices,486 underlining the group s
increasing propensity toward European targets which continued throughout
1991, mainly because of 17N s dissatisfaction with EC financial arrange-
ments. But the most significant event that fueled 17N s violence during this
year was the US-led Operation Desert Storm, as a response to which 17N
violence reached its historical annual peak with 22 attacks in 1991.487 Oper-
ationally, the year saw a resurrection of bombings, a trend that started in
late 1990 with the November assassination of US Air Force Sergeant Ronald
Steward. The primary method, however, remained attacks using the missiles
stolen from the Sikoirio army depot in 1989. Even though most of these
attacks were still human activated, the year 1991 also witnessed the intro-
duction of timing devices consisting of two table clocks and a 12 volt
battery. Another interesting development throughout the year was the
resumption of advance warnings which preceded some 17N attacks, and
the introduction of a new method of claiming credit by spray painting the
group s symbol on a wall near the target location a measure introduced as
a response to the media s compliance with a parliamentary request not to
publish terrorists claims of responsibility.488 And finally, also notable in
1991 was the October assassination of Turkish Embassy s press attach�, who
was killed by a spray of .45 caliber bullets fired by two assailants on a
motorcycle.489 The significance of this attack rests in the fact that this was
the first time the group used its signature tactic in nearly two years.
Directly resulting from 17N s increased level of armed activity during
1991 the security in Athens was stepped up with a high visibility police
presence, based on the fear that a more violent 17N faction had taken over
the group s military operations.490 It was probably these security measures
that caused the dramatic decline in the frequency of 17N attacks starting
with the year 1992. Another factor that likely contributed to this develop-
ment was the accidental killing of a 28-year-old student during the 14 July
assassination attempt against finance minister Yannis Paleokrassas.491 This
accidental killing that was also accompanied by the injury of six innocent
132 Revolutionary Organization November 17
bystanders dealt a significant popularity blow to the organization; its sub-
sequent attempts to displace blame for the civilian casualties onto the
authorities according to Kassimeris also revealed the group s growing
detachment from reality. 492
17N s operational decline continued throughout 1993, with the group
engaging only in sporadic and insignificant bombings of tax offices and
vehicles.493 This decline carried over to 1994 despite the 17N s attempt to
restore operational morale by the close-quarter assassination of former Bank
of Greece director Michalis Vranopoulos, who was killed by gunmen armed
with a .45 caliber semi-automatic pistol.494 17N also attempted to step up
its operations by the synchronized attack on Alico and Nationale Nederlan-
den insurance companies in April, using an anti-tank missile and a time
bomb, respectively. On the very same day, the group also announced that it
would attack the British aircraft carrier Ark Royal anchored at Piraeus.
Following up on this threat, police found and disarmed two 2.3 inch rockets
in a metal pipe and a firing mechanism placed on a building site along the
Miaoulis coast in Piraeus.495 This incident dealt another public image blow
to 17N, since the failure was covered widely in the media, with some reports
openly suggesting that 17N was in decline. Such commentaries in the main-
stream media greatly diminished the group s aura of the organossi phantasma
or phantom group that it once had.496 As a consolidation attempt after the
Piraeus embarrassment, 17N gunmen assassinated a senior Turkish diplo-
mat with six bullets fired from the original 1911 .45 caliber pistol.497
However, the group still was not able to live up to its constant pledges to
escalate its campaign and managed to launch only one attack throughout the
year 1995.498 The same trend continued in 1996, with the group s single
action being the failed attempt to fire a missile at the US Embassy in
Athens, where the rocket bounced off the wall in front of the building and
exploded some 100 meters away from its target.499 The credit for this attack
was not claimed by the group until June 1997, when ship-owner Peratikos
became the next victim of 17N s signature assassination.500
For the next two years 17N focused mainly on protesting the NATO
actions in Serbia by stepping up its rocket campaign, and throughout the
1998 1999 period about a dozen rocket attacks were launched against US
businesses, banks, PASOK offices and residences of western ambassadors
all causing only minimal damage.501 On 8 June 2000, the last 17N signa-
ture operation took place, when Brigadier Stephen Saunders was shot and
killed by two gunmen on a motorcycle.502 Finally on 29 June 2002, a man
later identified as Savvas Xiros was seriously injured by the premature explo-
sion of a bomb in Piraeus. At the scene of the explosion, the police recovered
a bag containing two hand grenades and a .38 caliber revolver, which had
been stolen from a police officer in 1984 and which had been used by the
17N in its two shootouts with the police.503 Also found were a set of keys [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

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